Columbia crypto box

[Adam Fields]

On Sun, Feb 09, 2003 at 11:34:01PM -0500, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
> First, there was no key management.  This means that loss of a single 
> unit -- a stolen laptop or a disgruntled (ex-)employee would do -- 
> compromises the entire network, since it's impossible to rekey 
> everything at once in an organization of any size.  For most real-world 
> deployments, this is the most serious weakness.  Furthermore, if there 
> were real key management, the next two problems couldn't have happened.
> This was clearly avoidable.

Practically, what's the right way to do this? You could do it with a
centralized server key that has the ability to broadcast a new shared
key to all clients, but then if the server gets compromised you lose
control of the entire network (possibly true anyway, for different
reasons).

>From my personal (limited) experience, key management is really
hard. I'm curious about potential solutions to this.

-- 
				- Adam

-----
Adam Fields, Managing Partner, fields at surgam.net
Surgam, Inc. is a technology consulting firm with strong background in
delivering scalable and robust enterprise web and IT applications.
http://www.adamfields.com

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