traffic analysis
David Wagner
daw at mozart.cs.berkeley.edu
Thu Aug 28 16:26:27 EDT 2003
John S. Denker wrote:
>More specifically, anybody who thinks the scheme
>I described is vulnerable to a timing attack isn't
>paying attention. I addressed this point several
>times in my original note. All transmissions
>adhere to a schedule -- independent of the amount,
>timing, meaning, and other characteristics of the
>payload.
Are you sure you understood the attack? The attack assumes that
communications links are insecure. The *transmission* from Alice may
adhere to a fixed schedule, but that doesn't prevent the attacker from
introducing delays into the packets after transmission.
For instance, suppose I want to find out who is viewing my web site.
I have a hunch that Alice is visiting my web site right this instant,
and I want to test that hunch. I delay Alice's outgoing packets, and I
check whether the incoming traffic to my web contains matching delays.
If so, it's a good bet that Alice has a connection open to my site.
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