[p2p-hackers] decentralized incentive engineering: GNUnet
R. A. Hettinga
rah at shipwright.com
Fri Aug 22 21:55:56 EDT 2003
--- begin forwarded text
Status: U
From: "Zooko" <zooko at zooko.com>
To: mnet-devel at lists.sourceforge.net, p2p-hackers at zgp.org
Subject: [p2p-hackers] decentralized incentive engineering: GNUnet
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Date: 22 Aug 2003 12:36:14 -0400
Hello mnet-devel and p2p-hackers. I've written some notes about a GNUnet
paper and put it on my "http://zooko.com/reading.html".
After waiting in vain, for about an hour, for my friends to check my web page
and write letters to me about decentralized incentive engineering, I lost
patience and decided to send it to these lists.
--Zooko
An Excess-Based Economic Model for Resource Allocation in Peer-to-Peer
Networks
dura-link [1] v1.0.1 entry above [2]
This is a reasonable stab at the problem from an engineering approach. The
ideas are actually implemented, as I understand it, in GNUnet. It is
completely decentralized, and they've given thought to the detailed problems:
newbies, transitive operations, systemic attack resistance. It feels like
exploratory work, and the author admits as much. He includes, for example, a
"proof" that the attack resistance of the system as a whole is bounded by the
attacker's bandwidth, but it is so specific to GNUnet's design and its
assumptions that it isn't an exciting general result. These GNUnet-specific
assumptions include that all traffic is request-response pairs, the requests
are the only things that trigger consumption of resources, the responses are
verifiable (except that this verification isn't yet implemented in the current
GNUnet), and so on.
Still, to his credit the author is clear that this is exploratory, and he
clearly indicates his plans for future work.
On a personal note, it is bittersweet to see some ideas that we implemented in
Mojo Nation being reinvented here, such as the central notion of
"excess-based" accounting, in which services are free when the server is idle
anyway. I don't feel pride about this -- rather I feel regret that we didn't
document what we did, and gratitude that the GNUnet folks are doing the world
a better service by documenting their ideas. Also, of course, GNUnet is not
identical to Mojo Nation, as GNUnet lacks the centralized component that Mojo
Nation had.
The basic approach that GNUnet takes to decentralized incentives is very like
what I've been planning for Mnet v0.7. For anyone out there who is familiar
with Mojo Nation, it is pretty much what you get by leaving the
"KEEP_RUNNING_WHEN_TOKENSERVER_IS_DOWN" flag set and then adding some tweaks
to favor the most useful of your peers. If you are interested in decentralized
incentives in Mnet v0.7, you should read this paper.
[1] http://zooko.com/reading.html#notes_GNUnet_ExcessBased_Economics
[2] http://zooko.com/reading.html#entry_GNUnet_ExcessBased_Economics
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--- end forwarded text
--
-----------------
R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
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