Cryptogram: Palladium Only for DRM

[Anne & Lynn Wheeler]

At 06:02 AM 9/17/2002 +0000, David Wagner wrote:
>I wasn't thinking of pure software solutions.  I was thinking of a
>combination of existing hardware + new software: use the MMU to provide
>separate address spaces, and use a secure VM or OS kernel to limit what
>those processes can do.  As far as I can see, this can provide just as
>much protection against viruses for your bank account as Palladium can.
>
>In general, with software and existing hardware working together, I
>suspect we can already do everything Palladium can do, except for the DRM
>and related applications founded on taking control away from the owner
>of the machine.  Maybe I'm missing something.  Still, it seems to me that
>Palladium would much more compelling if it left out the tamper-resistant
>chip and gave up on the semi-coercive DRM-like applications.


couple refs to multics study
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#8 Backdoor in AES ?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#10 Backdoor in AES ?


--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler      lynn at garlic.com,  http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/ 


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