Cryptogram: Palladium Only for DRM

[Niels Ferguson]

Well, I'm tired of this. AARG, or whoever is hiding behind this pseudonym,
is obviously not reading the responses that I send, as he keeps asking
questions I already answered. I'm not going to waste more of my time
responding to this. This is my last post in this thread.

Have Fun!

Niels

At 00:00 17/09/02 -0700, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
>Niels Ferguson writes:
>
>> Like I said before, most of the Pd stuff is really welcome. Everything
>> except the secure chip is a great improvement, and long overdue. My
>> observation is that the secure chip is only needed to do DRM, and that
>> trying to sell it to the public under the 'we need more security' banner is
>> bogus.
>
>I will respond more tomorrow, but just to clarify: you can't think of
>any situation in the banking example where it would be useful for the
>server to have confidence that the client is running legitimate software?
>This would add no security to any form of distributed banking software?
>
>And more generally, you can't think of any application, other than DRM,
>where it would be useful for a server to have some assurance that a
>remote system was running a particular piece of software?  Nothing at all?
>
>It's funny how people have different blind spots.  Microsoft supposedly
>can't think of any way to use Pd for DRM and yet Lucky Green comes up
>with several methods without even trying.  Turn the tables, and the
>greatest cryptographic minds in the field can't come up with good uses
>for secure attestation, but an ordinary guy like me comes up with a
>handful while walking the dog.
>
>
==============================================================
Niels Ferguson, niels at ferguson.net, phone: +31 20 463 0977
PGP: 3EC2 3304 9B6E 27D9  72E7 E545 C1E0 5D7E

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