Cryptogram: Palladium Only for DRM

[David Wagner]

AARG!Anonymous  wrote:
>David Wagner writes:
>> Standard process separation, sandboxes, jails, virtual machines, or other
>> forms of restricted execution environments would suffice to solve this
>> problem.
>
>Nothing done purely in software will be as effective as what can be done
>when you have secure hardware as the foundation.

I wasn't thinking of pure software solutions.  I was thinking of a
combination of existing hardware + new software: use the MMU to provide
separate address spaces, and use a secure VM or OS kernel to limit what
those processes can do.  As far as I can see, this can provide just as
much protection against viruses for your bank account as Palladium can.

In general, with software and existing hardware working together, I
suspect we can already do everything Palladium can do, except for the DRM
and related applications founded on taking control away from the owner
of the machine.  Maybe I'm missing something.  Still, it seems to me that
Palladium would much more compelling if it left out the tamper-resistant
chip and gave up on the semi-coercive DRM-like applications.

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