Analysis of Neural Cryptography

[John Young]

Analysis of Neural Cryptography

Alexander Klimov, Anton Mityaguine, and Adi Shamir
Computer Science Department
The Weizmann Institute, Rehovot 76100, Israel
{ask,mityagin,shamir}@wisdom.weizmann.ac.il 

Abstract. In this paper we analyse the security of a new key exchange
protocol proposed in [3], which is based on mutually learning neural 
networks. This is a new potential source for public key cryptographic 
schemes which are not based on number theoretic functions, and 
have small time and memory complexities. In the first part of the paper 
we analyse the scheme, explain why the two parties converge to a 
common key, and why an attacker using a similar neural network is 
unlikely to converge to the same key. However, in the second part 
of the paper we show that this key exchange protocol can be broken 
in three different ways, and thus it is completely insecure. 
____________________

  3. Ido Kanter, Wolfgang Kinzel, Eran Kanter, "Secure exchange of information
  by synchronization of neural networks'', Europhys., Lett. 57, 141, 2002.

http://cryptome.org/neuralsub.ps (11 pages. 366KB)


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