DRMs vs internet privacy (Re: Ross's TCPA paper)

Lucky Green shamrock at cypherpunks.to
Thu Jun 27 01:15:59 EDT 2002


Adam Back wrote:
> I don't mean that you would necessarily have to correlate 
> your viewing habits with your TrueName for DRM systems.  
> Though that is mostly
> (exclusively?) the case for current deployed (or at least 
> implemented with a view of attempting commercial deployment) copy-mark
> (fingerprint) systems, there are a number of approaches which 
> have been suggested, or could be used to have viewing privacy.

The TCPA specs were carefully designed to permit the user to obtain
multiple certificates from multiple CA's and thus, if, and that's a big
if, the CA's don't collude and furthermore indeed discard the true name
identities of the customer, utilize multiple separate identities for
various online applications. I.e., the user could have one cert for
their True Name, one used to enable Microsoft Office, and one to
authenticate the user to other online services.

It is very much the intent of the TCPA to permit the use of pseudonymous
credentials for many, if not most, applications. Otherwise, the TCPA's
carefully planned attempts at winning over the online liberty groups
would have been doomed from the start.

--Lucky Green


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