E-voting paper analyzes "usability" problems of current syste ms

[Matt Blaze]

> > Forwarded below is an email from Dr. Rebecca Mercuri whose
> > PhD dissertation contained a proof that an electronic voting
> > system can be either secure (tamper proof) or anonymous
> > (as in secret ballot), but NOT BOTH
> 
> What part of the proof fails for non-electronic voting?
> 

Paper ballots aren't "secure" in most senses of the term as we'd
apply it to electronic voting - they can be tampered with, etc. and
there's no way for the voter to even tell.  In a paper system,
the tallying mechanism is a "trusted" component (another example
of where the technical term "trusted" refers an undesirable property
of a system, even though the colloquial use of the word usually
describes something good).

-matt





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