E-voting paper analyzes "usability" problems of current systems

[Matthew Byng-Maddick]

On Wed, Jun 19, 2002 at 07:13:17AM -0500, Dean, James wrote:
> > Forwarded below is an email from Dr. Rebecca Mercuri whose
> > PhD dissertation contained a proof that an electronic voting
> > system can be either secure (tamper proof) or anonymous
> > (as in secret ballot), but NOT BOTH
> What part of the proof fails for non-electronic voting?

I don't know how you do it in the US, but in the UK, votes are not strictly
anonymous. It is a question of who has access to which paper trails that
make it "effectively" anonymous. I suspect, then, that this proof can
extend to paper-based voting in exactly the same way.

MBM

-- 
Matthew Byng-Maddick         <mbm at colondot.net>           http://colondot.net/

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