Surveillance, submarines, global politics

Thu Jun 6 10:02:13 EDT 2002

http://lw.pennnet.com/Articles/Article_Display.cfm?Section=Articles&Subsection=Display&ARTICLE_ID=143012&KEYWORD=surveillance=

Surveillance, submarines, global politics

BY STEPHEN N. BROWN

Along-known selling point of fiber optics is that it either inhibits or
prevents surveillance of communications. This particular aspect of fiber
optics is now a line of political separation between the political aims of
the European Union and those of the United States and potentially a line of
conflict between the United States and China.

The EU takes comfort that fiber optics shields communications from
surveillance. European Commission member Erkki Liikanen said in speech of
Sept. 5, 2001: "The development in technologies can bring protection
against surveillance. It is a comforting finding that...fibre-optic cables
instead of satellites for transcontinental communications ha[ve] decreased
the possibilities for large-scale routine interception....The Commission
attaches the utmost importance to the respect of human rights and the
respect of rules of law."

Limited access
Liikanen's remarks were prompted by the findings of the European
Parliament's "Temporary Committee on the Echelon Interception
System...Draft Report," issued in May 2001: "[T]he use of submarines for
the routine surveillance of international telephone traffic can be ruled
out. The new-generation fibre-optic cables use erbium lasers as
regenerators [which prevent] interception by means of electromagnetic
coupling"-meaning that for any fiber route where signals need
amplification, the points of surveillance dwindle when optical amplifiers
replace optoelectronic repeaters.

The report's author, Gerhard Schmid, quickly arrived at the obvious
conclusion: Whether on land or undersea, fiber-optic routes having no need
for signal amplification or using optical amplifiers exclusively can be
tapped only at an "incoming or outgoing" optoelectronic terminus that
happens to be in the eavesdropper's territory. Schmid said further:
"[Non-European nations] have access only to a very limited proportion of
[European] Internet communications transmitted by [fiber] cable...only a
very small proportion of intra-European Internet communications are routed
via the USA....A small proportion of intra-European communications are
routed via a switch in London to which the British monitoring station GCHQ
has access. The majority of [European] communications do not leave the
continent...more than 95% of German Internet communications are routed via
a switch in Frankfurt."

Now it is easy to see why the German and European Internets were convenient
staging areas for the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States-the
perpetrators' Internet traffic had a tiny chance of being surveilled by
either the United States or United Kingdom, nations that lost citizens in
the New York City attack. Liikanen's emphasis on "human rights" and respect
for "rules of law" last September now looks more akin to misplaced delight
about keeping American and British snoopers out of the EU communications
system rather than support for principles that should govern and pervade
Internet use.

Meanwhile, the U.S. government is determined to overcome fiber's apparent
invulnerability to surveillance. In December, the House of Representatives
introduced H.R. 3555, The United States Security Act. Section 311, Secure
Our Fiber Optic Infrastructure, reads: "the Secretary of Commerce...shall
transmit to Congress a report...[that] assess[es] but [is] not...limited to
[the] use of sophisticated techniques to exploit active fiber-optic cable,
to extract data or degrade or permanently darken fiber over time."

According to the Washington Post, the National Security Agency "is known to
be hard at work trying to gain access to fiber-optic cables" and the U.S.
Navy will spend "$1 billion to retrofit its premier spy submarine, the USS
Jimmy Carter" to get access to deep-sea fiber routes. But the Navy is not
the only group interested in deep-sea capability. In June 1998, the House
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy heard testimony from the
Director of the Center for Security Policy, Frank J. Gaffney, who
complained about the Clinton administration's trade policy: "[T]he People's
Republic of China received sophisticated micro-bathymetry equipment,
6,000-meter-capable video, and side-scan sonar systems from the United
States. This equipment is intended to be used for deep-seabed mining, but
we will likely see these technologies being instead used to advance China's
anti-submarine warfare capability and to help the PRC discover undersea
bastions in which to conceal and operate their ballistic-missile
submarines."

Proxy fight?

Protecting, tapping, or destroying fiber routes may one day be de rigueur
for military planners. Perhaps that explains the shadow boxing over Global
Crossing's (GX's) deep-sea assets. The press has treated GX as just another
fiber-network using political influence and trick accounting to mislead the
market

before filing bankruptcy in January. Poor GX, an unwanted ugly duckling
until Singapore and Hong Kong business interests came courting in early
February, offering $750 million cash and debt restructuring-a good deal for
the buyers.

At about the same time, the slightest nuance of strategic consideration
slipped into public view. The New York Times floated a story that GX was to
receive a $450-million contract with the Department of Defense for
"connecting 6,000 scientists working on military projects," but that a
transfer of ownership to foreign interests would either halt the project or
cause the DoD to use another network. In early March, Al Gore's Technology
Group of Los Angeles announced a counter offer that would give
"substantially more value" to GX's creditors than the offer from Singapore
Technologies Telemedia and the Hong Kong conglomerate, Hutchison Whampoa,
both of whom hold minority stakes in GX.

For a very low price, someone is going to acquire a set of undersea fiber
routes that crisscross the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and connect over 20
nations and perhaps resell or lease the network at a handsome profit to
another party that could have its very own undersea communications network
and training ground. The bankruptcy court had set April 23 as the deadline
to receive proposals to take over the now-bankrupt GX.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Stephen N. Brown writes on public policy in telecommunications. He can be
contacted by e-mail at policywork at aol.com or telephone: 615-399-1239.
Lightwave May, 2002
Author(s) :   Steven Brown

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