building a true RNG

[David Honig]

At 10:45 AM 7/29/02 -0700, David Wagner wrote:
>On the gripping hand, I don't think this is a real issue in practice.
>SHA1 is probably good enough for all practical purposes that I can
>think of.

In software.  There are not many fast, hardware-efficient crypto hash
functions.  DES, being extremely hardware friendly, can be (ab)used to
make a strong one-way hash.  (E.g., raw input into both key and data maps
56+64 -> uniformly distributed 64 bits.)


At 03:40 PM 7/27/02 -0700, Joseph Ashwood wrote:
>So you've managed to create a true RNG, that provably generates 100% entropy
>output, that supports the speeds necessary to support the substantial
>throughput of the Sprint US backbone? (several thousand OC-11s) 

"Whether there is a need for very high bandwidth RNGs" was discussed
on cypherpunks a few months ago, and no examples were found.
(Unless you're using something like a one-time pad where you need
a random bit for every cargo bit.)  Keeping in mind that
a commerical crypto server can often accumulate entropy during
off-peak hours.  







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