biometrics

Carl Ellison cme at acm.org
Sat Jan 26 21:39:32 EST 2002


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At 03:55 PM 1/26/2002 -0500, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
>
>"cryptography at summitsecurity.org" <cryptography at summitsecurity.org>
>writes: 
>> Not wanting to have extended contest over this,
>
>I'm afraid I'm not letting it drop.
>
>> but all these absolutes in
>> the comments are just too simplistic. Devices can be made as
>> tamper-resistant as the threat- and value-model required.
>
>No, they can't. That's an engineering hope, not an engineering
>reality. The hope you're expressing is that "well, maybe we can't
>make it impossible to break this design, but we can make it cost
>more to
>break the system than breaking it will bring the bad guy, and we can
>do that without said tamper-resistance costing us more than we can
>afford."

I've heard rumor of an effort a while back to layer Thermite into a
printed circuit board, so that a machine could self-destruct in case
of tampering.  I doubt it ever got reviewed by OSHA, however. :)


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+------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Carl M. Ellison         cme at acm.org     http://world.std.com/~cme |
|    PGP: 08FF BA05 599B 49D2  23C6 6FFD 36BA D342                 |
+--Officer, officer, arrest that man. He's whistling a dirty song.-+



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