theory: unconditional security

[Greg Rose]

At 10:15 PM 2/16/2002 +0000, Zefram wrote:
>I've not been able to find any paper that describes the use of this
>algorithm to give unconditional secrecy and integrity at once.
>Nor have I found any paper describing doing this (as MAC or as
>secrecy-plus-integrity) in GF(2^n), which makes it convenient to operate
>on bit strings.  This seems so stunningly useful that I'm surprised it's
>not mentioned in AC.

Like One-Time Pads, it seems stunningly useful only until you consider the 
practicalities. You still need key material as long as (in fact, twice as 
long as) the message, and you still cannot ever reuse the key material.

>Can anyone point me at references that I'm missing?

The sci.crypt FAQ has some material about why OTPs are useless in practice, 
and might have some references.

Greg.

Greg Rose                                       INTERNET: ggr at qualcomm.com
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