Palladium and malware

[Nomen Nescio]

Bill Frantz writes, regarding the possibility that the Palladium
architecture could be designed to resist the use of encrypted 
code:

> All general purpose computers require a way to move data space to code
> space to support compilation.

Well, this is usually done by storing the data to the disk, and
then later loading it as a program file.  It does not prevent data
and code memory from being distinct, which was the proposal for how
Palladium could reduce the risk of being used to run encrypted code.
If a Palladium program was forced to go through the disk, that is, to
load data, decrypt it, store it to the disk, and then load it as code,
then that would provide a means to get access to the unencrypted code,
defeating the goal of keeping the code within the "vault".

> Even if you don't allow compilation, most
> modern systems have enough different powerful scripting languages that
> interpretation is sufficient to support viruses.

It's not clear why these languages would use the Palladium features and
run their scripts in the shielded mode.  But you're right that if they
did, this could provide a mechanism for disassembly-resistant code.

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