No subject

AARG!Anonymous remailer at aarg.net
Fri Aug 9 19:10:08 EDT 2002


Adam Back writes a very thorough analysis of possible consequences of the
amazing power of the TCPA/Palladium model.  He is clearly beginning to
"get it" as far as what this is capable of.  There is far more to this
technology than simple DRM applications.  In fact Adam has a great idea
for how this could finally enable selling idle CPU cycles while protecting
crucial and sensitive business data.  By itself this could be a "killer
app" for TCPA/Palladium.  And once more people start thinking about how to
exploit the potential, there will be no end to the possible applications.

Of course his analysis is spoiled by an underlying paranoia.  So let me
ask just one question.  How exactly is subversion of the TPM a greater
threat than subversion of your PC hardware today?  How do you know that
Intel or AMD don't already have back doors in their processors that
the NSA and other parties can exploit?  Or that Microsoft doesn't have
similar backdoors in its OS?  And similarly for all the other software
and hardware components that make up a PC today?

In other words, is this really a new threat?  Or are you unfairly blaming
TCPA for a problem which has always existed and always will exist?

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