dangers of TCPA/palladium

[bear]

On Mon, 5 Aug 2002, AARG!Anonymous wrote:

>> Anonymous writes:
>> > And nobody's got the root key to my computer.  You make this claim
>> > in many places in the document.  What exactly is this "root key" in
>> > TCPA terms?  The endorsement key?  It's private part is generated
>> > on-chip and never leaves the chip!
>>
>> The "root key" to your computing environment is the private key of the
>> CA that signs the software updates.
>
>What software updates, exactly?  Spec reference?

The TCPA hardware and Palladium Software make it possible.  It's not
in the spec per se, but given the possibility, it will be done.


>I was talking about the optional TPM_FieldUpgrade function described on
>page 251 of the spec.  It is apparently intended for bug fixes and such.
>I doubt that there will be that many bug fixes, or that users will
>install them that often.  And if an upgrade does obvious bad things
>like the various despotic features you fear, keeping you from booting
>Linux or whatever, people can avoid installing it.

Uh-huh.  At the expense of their "trusted machine" status and causing
every last bit of TCPA-disabled software they've got to quit operating
correctly, and locking them out of their own confidential data which
they've got stored in sealed areas on the machine.  To say that this
gives them the choice to "avoid installing it" is at best fatuous.

Moreover, we're not that worried about *obvious* bad things... we're
worried about very, very *subtle* bad things.  Keyboard sniffers, screen
dumpers, web-cache readers, and other snoopware, if it has a "sealed"
data space to hide its malicious code and stolen data, runs without a
single detectable trace.  And, if it has an unmonitorable encrypted pipe
to the outside world (which it gets every time someone remote-authenticates
your machine) it can deliver that stolen data to untrusted parties.

The hardware supports installing such snoopware remotely as part of a
"bug fix".  Nobody can tell whether the content of a "bug fix" is or
isn't what's claimed.  Why should we assume that these businesses,
*knowing that nobody can find out*, won't screw everybody to the max?

>I don't see this as
>a mechanism for someone to take over the world.

Wow.  You must really be an idiot.


>Why exactly is this so much more of a threat than, say, flash BIOS
>upgrades?  The BIOS has a lot more power over your machine than the
>TPM does.

It may be worth noting that I haven't installed flash BIOS upgrades,
and won't until I can compile them myself. My machine still works
fine.  You're talking about a system where failure to install an
"upgrade" will cause loss of all the system's sealed data, which makes
it something other than voluntary.  The word "extort" comes to mind.

>The only way that TCPA will become as popular as you fear is if it really
>solves problems for people.  Otherwise nobody will pay the extra $25 to
>put it in their machine.

Assuming they are given a choice.

>Be concrete.  What changes would have to be made to TCPA to get the
>effects of a mandatory Clipper chip.  Would they be made in secret or
>would some government have to pass a law before it happened?  Would the
>changes happen in one country or all countries?  Paint me a scenario
>that has some kind of connection to reality.  Otherwise this sounds
>like South Park logic:

Okay, the changes are:
1. Somebody implements Clipper in software.
2. A "bug fix" for TCPA hardware is announced.
3. The Clipper application is made available for download.
4. The software checksums are changed to require it to be loaded at bootup
   for "trusted computing" status.
5. People find they can't get at their own data unless they install it.
6. People download it and install it.
7. Sure people can still boot linux.  But if they boot in
   "trusted" mode they'll have clipper installed on their system.

Note that this requires lying about what it is.  Note that we're
talking about companies and agencies that don't have a history of
avoiding lying.


				Bear


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