Challenge to David Wagner on TCPA

[James A. Donald]

    --
On 31 Jul 2002 at 23:45, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
> So TCPA and Palladium "could" restrict which software you could 
> run. They aren't designed to do so, but the design could be 
> changed and restrictions added.

Their design, and the institutions and software to be designed 
around them, is disturbingly similar to what would be needed to 
restrict what software we could run.  TCPA institutions and 
infrastructure are much the same as SSSCA institutions and 
infrastructure.

According to Microsoft, the end user can turn the palladium 
hardware off, and the computer will still boot.  As long as that 
is true, it is an end user option and no one can object.

But this is not what the content providers want.  They want that 
if you disable the Fritz chip, the computer does not boot.  What 
they want is that it shall be illegal to sell a computer capable 
of booting if the Fritz chip is disabled.

If I have to give superroot powers to Joe in order to run Joe's 
software or play Joe's content, fair enough.  But the hardware and 
institutions to implement this are disturbingly similar to the 
hardware and institutions needed to implement the rule that I have 
to give superroot powers to Joe in order to play Peter's software 
or content.. 

    --digsig
         James A. Donald
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     FQhKMpDHys7gyFWenHCK9p7+Xfh1DwpaqGKcztxk
     20jFdJDiigV/b1fmHBudici59omqc/Ze0zXBVvQLk


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