New encryption technology closes WLAN security loopholes

[Rick Smith at Secure Computing]

At 05:44 PM 9/24/2001, ji at research.att.com wrote:

>In increasingly many environments, the term "perimeter" makes little sense.
>See, for example, the CCS-2000 paper on Distributed Firewalls by Sotiris
>Ioannidis et al.  You can get it (among other places) from
>http://www.research.att.com/~smb/papers/ccs-df.pdf

If anything, the concept of 'perimeter' becomes more important as you look 
at distributed firewall architectures, since it becomes a lot trickier to 
discern what it is you've really managed to protect. I've been trying to 
craft a clear explanation of how/why it's hard to subvert the card-based 
distributed firewalls we developed with 3Com, and the perimeter concept is 
crucial to the argument.

In my own experience, the security perimeter(s) play an essential role 
whenever I try to explain real-world weaknesses in systems. I find I'm 
always drawing boxes (perimeters) around things in security architecture 
diagrams I draw.


Rick.
smith at securecomputing.com          roseville, minnesota
"Authentication" coming in October http://www.visi.com/crypto/




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