[FYI] FITUG Statement on Crypto Policy

Axel H Horns horns at ipjur.com
Tue Sep 18 15:30:25 EDT 2001


http://www.fitug.de/news/crypto-long-010918.html

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FITUG Statement on crypto policy                         2001-09-18

FITUG expresses its deepest sympathy for the victims of the heinous
attacks in the U.S.  

FITUG calls upon the governments around the world to ensure combating
of terrorism and other forms of crime on the basis of proper law
enforcement on the basis of law and justice in order to protect those
basic values constituting a free and democratic world.    

The tragic events have sparked off an increasing debate on 
legislative measures suitable to help preventing future acts of 
terrorism, in particular with regard but not limited to potential
future casualties including utilisation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD).    

One option recently proposed by various circles concerned comprises a
re-strengthening of the signal intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities of
the intelligence services and measures to facilitate the communication
eavesdropping of law enforcement agencies in order to be able to
uncover and monitor communication links of distributed groups of
terrorists or other criminals. When following this argumentation, the
availability of strong "unckrackable" encryption products to everybody
can be identified as a major obstacle blocking further progress in
anti-terrorism and anti-crime policy.       

Such view is, however, misleading, and any resulting legislative
activity based thereon will inevitably fail to reach its goal but
instead undermine the basic values of freedom and democracy which we
all do need to protect against terrorism in these grievous times.    

In particular, FITUG issues a number of observations as set out 
below:    

- Over-reliance of intelligence services and law enforcement agencies
on technology-based surveillance may well lead to a lack of awareness
of relevant facts. It has come to be known that frequently in
terrorist or other criminal groups some of the most important
information is relayed non-technologically, often carried by human
couriers. Oftenly, the communications methods employed by such
organisations are designed to defy technological surveillance.   

- Hence, the proper way to enhance the capabilities of the 
intelligence services and law enforcement agencies is to effect a
major reform of these institutions, abandoning contemporary visions of
defeating terrorism and other crime by monitoring the outside world by
masses of officials staring on countless computer screens installed
within high-security fortresses and displaying data gathered by SIGINT
techniques. The SIGINT hybris has to be stopped. What the services
actually need isn't more and more electronic access to private raw
information but more brain power in order to derive proper
conclusions. Let them then get out to mess with real terrorists and
other criminals in real life. This is where a solution of the current
crisis can be found.        

- Cryptography is now well established as a basic technology for
countless products of the emerging Information Society and, hence, a
complete ban thereof is deemed to be completely infeasible. Moreover,
in the late 90ies of the past centuries many recognised experts in the
field of cryptography have demonstrated that mandatory GAK is not a
real option on a technical level; countless technical problems of
large-scale GAK systems are still completely unresolved.     

- Some have said that the tragic events in the U.S. are an example of
high-tech terrorism. This is completely wrong. Although the captured
planes surely are high-tech, the way of capturing them by rogue
brutality exercised with knifes is absolutely low-tech. By no means
society should forget that there is a real risk of a very severe high-
 tech assault on the data networks of the wired world. However, 
widespread use of strong cryptography is a crucial brick in a 
framework to protect the sensitive technical network infrastructure of
the Information Society against attacks. Obstruction of free usage of
strong cryptography means irresponsibly weakening the infrastructual
framework of the emerging Information Society.     

- Last but not least, the right to privacy of the ordinary citizen is
one of the core values of a free democracy. Destroying the technical
basis for preserving privacy in the Information Society means to
deteriorate one of the essential characteristics of the free world.   

Whatever legislative steps are taken in response to the recent 
attacks, terrorists and other criminals will come up with effective
techniques to conceal what and with whom they communicate from where
to where, or even whether they store and communicate at all. Thus, if
legal restrictions are placed on the privacy permitted by the IT
infrastructure, only criminals will enjoy unrestricted privacy.   

In the current situation, law enforcement agencies should only be
allowed and enabled to exploit security weaknesses of IT systems still
present on the basis and within the limits of an explicit warrant
issued by a competent court. No duty to implement additional
weaknesses should be imposed by legislation whatsoever.    

Therefore, FITUG rejects all attempts to impose upon the citizens any
restrictive regulations of cryptography, i.e. in particular, but not
limited to, by demanding Governmental Access to Keys (GAK) schemes.  
Moreover, FITUG urges all policymakers as well as all relevant NGOs in
this field     

- to support any suitable measures to stop the current SIGINT hybris, 

- to support development of alternative effective measures to 
strengthen societies against the threats of terrorism and other 
crime, and      

- to strongly oppose any proposals to impose restrictive regulations
upon encryption.    

About FITUG

FITUG creates connections to the virtual world of new media and data 
networks. From our statues: "The association's purpose is the 
fostering of the integration of new media with society, public 
education about technologies, risks, and dangers of these media, and 
the fostering of human rights and consumer interests with respect to 
computer networks." FITUG is a member of the Global Internet Liberty 
Campaign (GILC).  

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