The tragedy in NYC
Arnold G. Reinhold
reinhold at world.std.com
Thu Sep 13 11:59:09 EDT 2001
At 9:20 AM +0300 9/13/2001, Amir Herzberg wrote:
>...
>
>In fact, if giving up crytpto completely would help substantially to protect
>against terror, I'll support it myself. But...
>
>The real argument is simple: there is no evidence or convincing argument why
>shutting down crypto will substantially help defend against terrorism. It is
>a popular, easy solution, good for politicians as it is an easy `sell` to
>the public, but not effective. That's why we should defend against it; the
>negligible help it may provide to law-enforcement is not worth its cost in
>loss of privacy and commerce, in the loss of freedom, and in the dangers of
>abuse by government.
>
>Best, Amir Herzberg
>
I would go one step further: the U.S. Government's misguided effort
to suppress crypto is a root cause of the massive vulnerability of
the United States information infrastructure. Manufacturers of
commercial operating systems and application software have sharply
limited the security features they include out of fear that their
products will be subject to export controls. If security isn't built
into foundation products, it can't be bolted on later.
Some say the reason security is lacking is that no one wants to pay
for it, but the software we use is bloated with features most people
don't need or want. Absent export controls I believe free markets
would have produced good security solutions because companies need
any competitive edge they can find.
In addition, many of the anti-crypto measures the government has
suggested in the past, such as key escrow, only create new
vulnerabilities. In time the security at escrow storage sites would
have degenerated to the joke level we saw at our airports.
The Pandora's box of strong crypto was opened long ago. The bad guys
already have it. The question is when will the good guys start using
it for real?
Arnold Reinhold
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