article: german secure phone

Derek Atkins warlord at MIT.EDU
Mon Jun 4 11:14:01 EDT 2001


It's sad that these guys couldn't at least be compatible
with the Starium guys.

-derek

Don Davis <dtd at world.std.com> writes:

> http://www.newscientist.com/dailynews/news.jsp?id=3Dns9999819
> 
> Portable privacy
> 
> A mobile phone that protects transmissions from
> sophisticated eavesdropping is launched in Germany
> 
> A mobile phone that protects transmissions from
> sophisticated eavesdropping has been launched in
> Germany.
> 
> Communications company Rohde Schwarz created the TopSec
> GSM phone by fitting military grade encryption hardware
> into an ordinary S35i Siemens mobile phone.
> 
> The company expects the device to appeal to businessmen
> who want to protect themselves against industrial
> espionage and government representatives concerned
> about spying. "In both cases communications have to be
> secure," says a company representative.
> 
> Ex-Nato technical expert Brian Gladman told New
> Scientist: "If done correctly, the encryption would be
> effectively attack-proof."
> 
> Although the GSM standard does protect transmissions by
> encoding them, a number of weaknesses have been
> discovered with the system. These could allow
> sophisticated eavesdroppers to listen in. The TopSec
> GSM phone is designed to provide an extra, robust layer
> of security.
> 
> The phone may not be for everyone, however. Each device
> costs =A31800 and so far only 500 handsets have been
> created. These must also be bought directly from Rohde
> Schwarz.
> 
> Private keys
> 
> The handset works like any normal GSM mobile phone. But
> users can establish a secure communications channel
> when "Crypto" is selected from the customised display
> menu. When a number is dialled and the Crypto function
> selected, the phone checks to see if the device at the
> other end is compatible. Currently, the phone works
> only with other TopSec mobile phones and ISDN phones
> produced by Rohde Schwarz.
> 
> If the device at the other end is compatible, each
> phone opens a data channel and exchanges its public
> encryption key. Using mathematically-linked private
> keys, the phones then establish a shared code for
> securing voice communications at speed.
> 
> It is theoretically possible to decipher messages
> encrypted in this way by trying all possible keys in
> succession. But in practice this would require a
> formidable amount of computational power. Rohde Schwarz
> estimates that it would take 100 average desktop
> computers 10 years to decrypt a 10-minute phone call.
> 
> Attack-proof
> 
> Although the encryption itself may be secure, Gladman
> says it might be possible to trick the phones into
> giving up their secrets using a "man in the middle"
> attack. This would involve carrying out a dummy key
> exchange with both parties and creating two secure
> channels. Each party would be communicating securely,
> but only through a third eavesdropper.
> 
> This technique would be beyond most industrial spies.
> Gladman says it might be within the capabilities of
> some government intelligence agencies, however.
> 
> Devices that work along similar lines are already used
> by the US military. And this is not the first attempt
> to make a commercial encryption phone. US company
> Starium has created a device that can be attached to
> standard phone lines in order to secure voice
> communications with encryption.
> 
> Web link:
> Rohde Schwarz  http://www.rohde-schwarz.com/
> 
> 1630 GMT, 31 May 2001
> 
> 
> 
> -
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
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-- 
       Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
       Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board  (SIPB)
       URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/    PP-ASEL-IA     N1NWH
       warlord at MIT.EDU                        PGP key available



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