I-P: Papers Illuminate Pearl Harbor Attack

[Arnold G. Reinhold]

This story smells of revisionism.  The events leading up to Pearl 
harbor are throughly chronicled in the first chapter of David Kahn's 
classic, The Codebreakers. In particular:

o The Tojo government, regarded as militarist, came into power in 
October 1941 (Togo was Tojo's foreign minister)

o The order to attack Pearl Harbor was promulgated on November 4

o The last ship of the Pearl Harbor strike force, the aircraft 
carrier Kuikaku, reached the fleet assembly point  in the Kuriles on 
November 19

o Japan presented its ultimatum to the U.S. on November 20, which 
would have required the U.S. to acquiesce to Japan's conquests in 
Asia and supply her with oil

o On November 25, the the Pearl Harbor strike force was ordered to 
leave on it mission at 6 am the next day

o The reply U.S. that the delivered to Japan on November 26 came 
"after a week of frantic ... consultations ..." (Kahn). These may 
have led to the Chinese cables reported in the story and created a 
flicker of hope among whatever doves remained in the Japanese 
government. It was not a close situation, however. Had the U.S. been 
willing to accede to Japan's terms, the strike could have been called 
off, but the die had been cast and Japan's war preparations were well 
under way. (Remember that Pearl Harbor was but one of many places 
that Japan attacked 60 years ago today).

As for the notion that "Japan may have tried to warn the United 
States about the attack," this is no doubt the famous 14-part 
telegram breaking off negotiations that was to be delivered to the 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull at 1 pm Washington time (7:30 am 
Honolulu time), 25 minutes before the first bomb fell.  The U.S. had 
intercepted and decoded the first 13 parts that telegram early on 
December 7. The last part and the portentous instruction to deliver 
it at 1 pm were recovered later that morning.  Secretary Hull was 
concerned about looking properly upset when he was handed the 
official copy by the Japanese ambassador, lest the ambassador suspect 
that Hull had already seen it. Kahn describes how Army attempts to 
deliver a final warning to Pear Harbor were bollixed up by 
communications problems.

Arnold Reinhold



At 11:33 AM -0500 12/6/01, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
>--- begin forwarded text
>
>
>Status:  U
>From: "Arnell" <Arnell at logicsouth.com>
>To: <ignition-point at theveryfew.net>
>Subject: I-P: Papers Illuminate Pearl Harbor Attack
>Date: Thu, 6 Dec 2001 09:12:58 -0500
>Sender: owner-ignition-point at theveryfew.net
>Reply-To: "Arnell" <Arnell at logicsouth.com>
>
>http://wire.ap.org/APnews/center_story.html?FRONTID=ASIA&STORYID=APIS7G7BPGO
>0
>
>DECEMBER 05, 19:33 ET
>Papers Illuminate Pearl Harbor Attack
>
>By MARI YAMAGUCHI
>Associated Press Writer
>
>KOBE, Japan (AP) - Japan may have attacked Pearl Harbor because decoded U.S.
>cables did not prepare its leaders for American demands that the imperial
>army withdraw from China and Southeast Asia, a Japanese scholar said
>Wednesday.
>
>Previously classified Foreign Ministry documents reveal a turning point that
>may have persuaded doves in the Japanese government that war with the United
>States was necessary, Kobe University law professor Toshihiro Minohara said.
>
>``The discovery will probably help reevaluate the history of this period,''
>Minohara told The Associated Press before announcing his findings.
>
>That turning point came in November 1941, just weeks before the Dec. 7
>attack that killed 2,390 and plunged America into World War II.
>
>Japan and the United States had been at odds for years over the imperial
>army's march through Asia. On Nov. 22, 1941, Tokyo intercepted a Chinese
>telegram saying the United States would propose allowing Japan to keep its
>colonies if it abandoned further aggression, Minohara said. The telegram was
>sent from the Chinese Embassy in Washington to Chinese government officials
>in the wartime capital of Chungking, now Chongqing.
>
>The sudden possibility of a compromise strengthened the position of Foreign
>Minister Shigenori Togo, who opposed war with the United States and was
>trying to persuade militarists in the government to back down, Minohara
>said.
>
>But the official U.S. position sent to Japan on Nov. 26 was entirely
>different: Agree to withdraw from China and Southeast Asia or say goodbye to
>a diplomatic solution.
>
>That message, sent to Japan's embassy in Washington by then-Secretary of
>State Cordell Hull, was interpreted as an ultimatum and convinced pacifists
>in the Japanese government that war was inevitable.
>
>``I was so shocked I even felt dizzy,'' Togo later wrote in his memoirs.
>``At this point, we had no choice but to take action.''
>
>Researchers also said Japan broke secret codes employed by the United
>States, Britain, China and Canada between May 18, 1941, and Dec. 3, 1941,
>Kyodo News Agency reported.
>
>Kobe University professor Makoto Iokibe said that ``defies the common
>belief...that Japan was behind in the information war against the U.S. and
>others,'' the agency reported.
>
>But Japan's extensive spying operations misguided it about Washington's
>intentions. Intercepted telegrams, from multiple sources including U.S.
>telegrams, suggested the United States was about to propose the two nations
>cooperate on obtaining natural resources in Southeast Asia, Minohara said.
>
>Japanese scholars researching declassified government documents also say
>Japan may have tried to warn the United States about the attack.
>
>The documents say staff at Japan's embassy in Washington were slow to
>decipher a de facto declaration of war and didn't hand it to the U.S.
>government until almost an hour after the attack began.
>
>
>FAIR USE NOTICE: This contains copyrighted material the use of which has
>not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. Such
>material is made available in an effort to advance understanding of
>environmental, political, human rights, economic, democracy, scientific,
>and social justice issues, etc. It is believed that this constitutes a
>'fair use' of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107
>of the US Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107,
>this material is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a
>prior interest in receiving similar information for research and
>educational purposes. For more information go to:
>http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml If you wish to use
>copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use',
>you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>============
>To UNSUBSCRIBE from the ignition-point list, send email to:
>majordomo at theveryfew.net
>In the body of the message, include only the line:
>unsubscribe ignition-point <your address>
>
>--- end forwarded text
>
>
>--
>-----------------
>R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
>The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
>44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
>"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
>[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
>experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'
>
>
>
>---------------------------------------------------------------------
>The Cryptography Mailing List
>Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to 
>majordomo at wasabisystems.com




---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo at wasabisystems.com