<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html charset=windows-1252"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; "><br><div><div>Op 20 sep. 2013, om 14:55 heeft Phillip Hallam-Baker <<a href="mailto:hallam@gmail.com">hallam@gmail.com</a>> het volgende geschreven:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr">On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 4:36 AM, Dirk-Willem van Gulik <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:dirkx@webweaving.org" target="_blank">dirkx@webweaving.org</a>></span> wrote:<br><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote">
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Op 19 sep. 2013, om 19:15 heeft Phillip Hallam-Baker <<a href="mailto:hallam@gmail.com">hallam@gmail.com</a>> het volgende geschreven:<br>
<div class="im"><br>
> Let us say I want to send an email to <a href="mailto:alice@example.com">alice@example.com</a> securely.<br>
</div>...<br>
> ppid:alice@example.com:example.net:Syd6BMXje5DLqHhYSpQswhPcvDXj+8rK9LaonAfcNWM<br>
…</blockquote></div></div></div></blockquote>...<br><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; border-left-width: 1px; border-left-color: rgb(204, 204, 204); border-left-style: solid; padding-left: 1ex; position: static; z-index: auto; ">
<div class="im"> <id>.<ns>.<namespace>.fqdn-in-some-tld.</div>
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which is in fact a first-come, first-served secure dynamic dns updatable zone containing the public key.<br>
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Which once created allows only updating to those (still) having the private key of the public key that signed the initial claim of that <id>.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Interesting, though I suspect this is attempting to meet different trust requirements than I am.</div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Most likely. The aim was not so much to secure an entry - but to provide a sufficiently solid bread-crum trail to the information which could be used to do so; to be able to use both 'trust on first contact' -or- a trust chain; and to provide 'low cost' yet very robust pillars that can be managed by 'untrusted' parties. </div><div><br></div><div>Or in other words - the design focused more on a workable trust infrastructure with the governance pushed as close to the (end) user as possible; at the expense of some 'absolute default' trust (absolute as in the sort of trust you'd get by default from 'some deity/governement/big-mega-crop says I am good/interacting with a legal entity).</div><div><br></div><div>Dw.</div></div><div><br></div></body></html>