[Cryptography] Threat Model: Bluetooth tracking beacons

Natanael natanael.l at gmail.com
Sat Sep 24 17:52:09 EDT 2016


Den 24 sep. 2016 23:14 skrev "Henry Baker" <hbaker1 at pipeline.com>:
>
> FYI --
>
>
https://motherboard.vice.com/read/apple-deleting-the-iphones-audio-jack-is-good-news-for-marketing-companies
>
> Anyone here have any good ideas of the *minimal* changes in Bluetooth
protocols to render these "beacons" (actually trackers) useless?

Bluetooth 4.2 LE Privacy 1.2

https://www.bluetooth.org/DocMan/handlers/DownloadDoc.ashx?doc_id=286439

> 5.4.5  Privacy Feature Bluetooth LE supports  a feature that reduces the
ability to  track a LE device over a period of time by changing the
Bluetooth device address on a frequent basis. The privacy feature is not
used in the GAP discovery mode and procedures but it is used, when
supported, during connection mode and connection procedures.

> In order for a device using the privacy feature to reconnect to known
devices, the device address, referred to as the private address, must be
resolvable by the other device. The private address is generated using the
device’s  resolving identity key (IRK)  exchanged during the  bonding
procedure.

> 6.5   DEVICE PRIVACY A private device shall not use its Identity  Address
in any packet type used on the advertising channels.

> 10.7   PRIVACY FEATURE The privacy feature provides  a level of privacy
which  makes it more difficult for an attacker to track a device over a
period of time. The  requirements for a device to support the privacy
feature are defined in  Table 10.3.

And so on...
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