[Cryptography] Secure erasure

[Ray Dillinger]

On 09/12/2016 05:46 PM, Jerry Leichter wrote:
>> So for which generally-used, widely-deployed system (where the opponent isn't
>> a nation-state) is DES the weakest point of attack?
> I know of no examples of such a thing, but a widely-deployed DRM system where the protection relied on DES might well be attacked through DES.
> 

It is very difficult to imagine a DRM system where you'd
need to attack the encryption rather than just reading
the key out of the player. DRM is a special case in that
the idiots who attempt it are putting the decryption keys
into the hands of the very people whom they're trying to
prevent from decrypting the content.

Essentially, if the device is a general purpose computer,
as opposed to a dedicated media player, then it is
GUARANTEED that someone will be able to stroll around
the encryption rather than attacking it.

				Bear



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