[Cryptography] Secure erasure

[Stephen Farrell]

On 11/09/16 10:50, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Which leads to a further corollary that anything more than maybe single DES
> when your opponent is anything other than a nation-state is probably a waste
> of time because there's always an easier way in.

Really? That seems awfully inaccurate to me. Single DES
does not require a nation state and passive attacks are
far less risky than active. I think you've let rhetoric
overly affect your words there, and in a way that could
cause harm.

I think it's a bad idea to encourage use of weak crypto.
If there are situations where we need to live with weak
crypto for some years, that's one thing, but claiming it
as a good is just a bad plan IMO not supported by risk
analyses.

S.

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