[Cryptography] How to prove Wikileaks' emails aren't altered

[Bill Frantz]

On 10/27/16 at 1:48 PM, jon at callas.org (Jon Callas) wrote:

>Sure, but the fact that these keys have been sitting on edge 
>MTAs for ages means that they could have been hacked otherwise. 
>The DKIM keys are low value keys, remember.
>
>On top of that -- why would you doubt the plaintext as is? We 
>all know that it's likely to be true. We all know that there's 
>a chance that some of it isn't, and we know that they juiciest 
>parts are the ones most likely to be a targeted forgery, which 
>could have been done by trading to some other gang who have 
>hacked some Google MTA.

While it is possible that forgeries might be produced by a gang, 
I think the motivation for a nation=state attacker is a lot 
better. The whole purpose of releasing these emails is to affect 
the US election and its perception around the world. That is 
most likely nation-state business. Nation-state attackers are 
likely to have better attack tools too. I could see a 
nation-state cooperating with a gang to perform the attack as well.

Cheers - Bill

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