[Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help

Tom Mitchell mitch at niftyegg.com
Thu Mar 3 00:11:19 EST 2016


On Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 9:03 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill at hallambaker.com>
wrote:

> On Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 7:16 PM, John Gilmore <gnu at toad.com> wrote:
> > Ron Garret suggested:
> >> The attack is not a brute force attack on the AES key, it's a brute
> force attack on the PIN.  It works like this:
>
.....

>
> This was the ground that the FBI chose, a high profile terrorist case.
>
:-(

> Having a Security Computing Unit (SCU) should be as ubiquitous in
> computer hardware as a GPU or a WiFi chip.
>

This makes a lot of sense... yep networking class logic block.
One risk is silicon cannot be updated.  But "channel" processing
is well understood.


> ...... I very much doubt that I
> would ever allow more than a few dozen machines connected to my
> confidential data profile. An attacker has to get hold of one of those
> physically and decap the SCU.


Recall, decapping the future SCU  approach just got harder.   Look back
about 8 days in this list where Jerry Leichter posted a note about the work
IBM is doing with graphite nano tubes fiber to generate a random
interconnect.  Their lab device test was for a 64 bit device but devices
large enough to be the unique ID inside a SCU should be possible.



-- 
  T o m    M i t c h e l l
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