[Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco

[covariant]

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On 02/17/2016 07:50 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> In this case, I don't think it is a close call. The phone's owner 
> is suspected of being a mass murderer and they are dead. I don't 
> think anyone has the right to privacy in those circumstances.

You are ignoring the privacy of anyone who might have had contact with
the owner of the phone. These people might not be dead, and they might
not have known that they were talking to a mass murderer.
The mere disclosure of the fact that they had contact with this person
is a severe privacy violation, that could easily lead to false
accusations and (public) embarrassment.

> It seems to me that Apple is fighting the wrong fight here. Any 
> security system that depends on a trusted third party not being 
> coerced is flawed. Waffling on about 'precedent' isn't going to 
> help matters.

I agree with this part of your analysis: Apple should simply not be
able to access that data. The fact that they can is, in truth, a
back-door.


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