[Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security

[mok-kong shen]

Am 05.02.2016 um 03:30 schrieb Henry Baker:

> There is an outstanding problem: if we all use the same primes, large nation-states can build log (rainbow-like) tables for these primes; if we use different primes, we then have to prove to our correspondent that the "prime" we propose is really prime.  Generating such primes and generating such easily-checkable proofs appears to take too much time for normal HTTPS ecommerce.

IMHO the "socat" event further supports my plea of having critical
IT-security software components be certified by trustworthy
institutions (see my post "Desirability of standard reference
pseudo-codes for essential components of IT-security software"
of 02.02.2016).

M. K. Shen