[Cryptography] RFC possible changes for Linux random device

[Jerry Leichter]

On Sep 18, 2014, at 5:09 AM, CodesInChaos <codesinchaos at gmail.com> wrote:
>> We're talking much bigger changes here, but if we're going to think big:  Encrypted swap space, with *per process* encryption keys, would be almost as effective, without the potential for such a denial of service attack.  The per-process swap key would go into this kind of "crypto-secure" memory, but that would be a strictly limited bit of memory.
> 1) How would per-process keys interact with shared memory?
See my response to Viktor Dukhovni.

> 2) This interacts badly with forward secrecy
How?
                                                        -- Jerry

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