[Cryptography] are ECDSA curves provably not cooked? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)

[Tony Arcieri]

On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 9:51 AM, Adam Back <adam at cypherspace.org> wrote:

> Right but weak parameter arguments are very dangerous - the US national
> infrastructure they're supposed to be protecting could be weakened when
> someone else finds the weakness.


As the fallout from the Snowden debacle has shown (with estimates of the
damage to US businesses in the tens of billions) the NSA seems to be
unconcerned with the blowback potential of doing things that are
potentially damaging when discovered. I wouldn't put it past them to
intentionally weaken the NIST curves.

That said, my gut feeling is they probably didn't.

-- 
Tony Arcieri
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