[Cryptography] RSA Key Extraction via Low-Bandwidth Acoustic Cryptanalysis

[Phillip Hallam-Baker]

On Wed, Dec 18, 2013 at 9:24 PM, Jerry Leichter <leichter at lrw.com> wrote:

> On Dec 18, 2013, at 7:50 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>
> As a student I was fortunate enough to attend one of Adi Shamir's lectures
>> at the university of Waterloo where he talked specifically about this
>> problem. It stuck with me and I'm glad to see that an actual key recovery
>> attack came out of it.
>> Have you trief this out against openssl ? How succesful do you think it
>> would be ?
>>
>
> I would expect it to work against any crypto code that has not been
> designed to avoid power or RF analysis....
>
> I've only read a very small part of the paper, but ... this isn't true.
>  In fact, the paper comments that the techniques used to block traditional
> RF and power attacks make the acoustic attacks *easier*.  (The acoustic
> attacks, by their nature, operate in a very much lower frequency band than
> traditional attacks.  A side-effect of the traditional defenses is to tamp
> down the irrelevant low-frequency stuff while not stopping the
> low-frequency information they actually need.
>

I was thinking about the randomization defenses.

RF shielding etc is going to be borked, yep.



-- 
Website: http://hallambaker.com/
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