January 2007 Archives by subject

• Messages sorted by: [ thread ] [ author ] [ date ]
• More info on this list...

Starting: Tue Jan 2 13:43:14 EST 2007
Ending: Wed Jan 31 17:25:00 EST 2007
Messages: 172

• "Free WiFi" man-in-the-middle scam seen in the wild.   Perry E. Metzger
• "Free WiFi" man-in-the-middle scam seen in the wild.   Derek Atkins
• "Free WiFi" man-in-the-middle scam seen in the wild.   Matthias Bruestle
• "Free WiFi" man-in-the-middle scam seen in the wild.   Roy M. Silvernail
• "Free WiFi" man-in-the-middle scam seen in the wild.   Perry E. Metzger
• "Free WiFi" man-in-the-middle scam seen in the wild.   James A. Donald
• "Free WiFi" man-in-the-middle scam seen in the wild.   Florian Weimer
• "IEEE 1667" approved   Perry E. Metzger
• (Short) Intro and question   Allen
• (Short) Intro and question   Steven M. Bellovin
• (Short) Intro and question   Ivan Krstić
• (Short) Intro and question   Saqib Ali
• (Short) Intro and question   Chris Kuethe
• [Cryptocollectors] STU III 2500   Richard Brisson
• [Cryptocollectors] STU III 2500   Steven M. Bellovin
• [Cryptocollectors] STU III 2500   Roy M. Silvernail
• [Cryptocollectors] STU III 2500   Rui Paulo
• [Cryptocollectors] STU III 2500   Taral
• [rachna at deas.harvard.edu: [fc-announce] Usable Security--Prelim Program--Jan 8 Hotel Deadline]   R. Hirschfeld
• [spock at cert.org: [fc-announce] FC07: Preliminary program and call for participation]   R. Hirschfeld
• A web site that believes in crypto   Steven M. Bellovin
• A web site that believes in crypto   Erik Tews
• A web site that believes in crypto   Victor Duchovni
• analysis and implementation of LRW   Roland Dowdeswell
• analysis and implementation of LRW   james hughes
• analysis and implementation of LRW   David Wagner
• analysis and implementation of LRW   Travis H.
• analysis and implementation of LRW   Peter Gutmann
• analysis and implementation of LRW   Alexander Klimov
• analysis and implementation of LRW   Andrea Pasquinucci
• analysis and implementation of LRW   Ben Laurie
• analysis and implementation of LRW   David Wagner
• analysis and implementation of LRW   Peter Gutmann
• analysis and implementation of LRW   Peter Gutmann
• analysis and implementation of LRW   David Wagner
• analysis and implementation of LRW   Allen
• analysis and implementation of LRW   Hal Finney
• analysis and implementation of LRW   Victor Duchovni
• Attacking the hash (WAS: Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases)   Allen
• Banking Follies   Perry E. Metzger
• Banking Follies   John Ioannidis
• Banking Follies   Steven M. Bellovin
• Banking Follies   John Ioannidis
• Banking Follies   Adam Shostack
• Banking Follies   Matt Crawford
• block cipher modes and collisions   Travis H.
• Chaos on a chip   Sean McGrath
• data under one key, was Re: analysis and implementation of LRW   Travis H.
• data under one key, was Re: analysis and implementation of LRW   Allen
• encrypting files with lots of different keys   Perry E. Metzger
• Forwarded: Request for Comments on primality testing   Steven M. Bellovin
• Fw: NIST announces Draft Requirements and Evaluation Criteria for New Hash Algorithms   Steven M. Bellovin
• Fwd: [FDE] Inside interview with Seagate on it's new FDE Drive   Saqib Ali
• Fwd: [FDE] Largest Ever Single FDE implementation   Florian Weimer
• How to leak a secret and not get caught   PeterThermos
• How to leak a secret and not get caught   Marcos el Ruptor
• How to leak a secret and not get caught   Jeremy Hansen
• Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and secure.   Matt Blaze
• Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and secure.   Steven M. Bellovin
• Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and secure.   Ed Gerck
• Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and secure.   Ed Gerck
• Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and secure.   Andrea Pasquinucci
• Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and secure.   Leichter, Jerry
• Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and secure.   Steven M. Bellovin
• Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and secure.   Leichter, Jerry
• Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and secure.   Matt Blaze
• Intuitive cryptography that's also practical and secure.   Anton Stiglic
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Steve Schear
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Steve Schear
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Steven M. Bellovin
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Brian Gladman
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Nicholas Bohm
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Steve Schear
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Bill Stewart
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Jonathan Thornburg
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   james hughes
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Saqib Ali
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Steven M. Bellovin
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Jonathan Thornburg
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Jonathan Thornburg
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Saqib Ali
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Saqib Ali
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Steven M. Bellovin
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Saqib Ali
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Steven M. Bellovin
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   David I. Emery
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Saqib Ali
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Steven M. Bellovin
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Jonathan Thornburg
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Saqib Ali
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Chris Kuethe
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Damien Miller
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Allen
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Saqib Ali
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Victor Duchovni
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Peter Gutmann
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   Victor Duchovni
• It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are not using FDE?   james hughes
• length-extension and Merkle-Damgard hashes   Travis H.
• length-extension and Merkle-Damgard hashes   Jeremy Hansen
• length-extension and Merkle-Damgard hashes   Amir Herzberg
• Molecular Keypad Lock   silvio
• more on NIST hash competition   Perry E. Metzger
• more on NIST hash competition   Ivan Krstić
• more on NIST hash competition   Paul Hoffman
• more on NIST hash competition   Peter Gutmann
• more on NIST hash competition   Paul Hoffman
• MS responds to Gutmann's Vista paper   Ivan Krstić
• MS responds to Gutmann's Vista paper   Ivan Krstić
• MS responds to Gutmann's Vista paper   Peter Gutmann
• News.com: IBM donates new privacy tool to open-source Higgins   John Gilmore
• News.com: IBM donates new privacy tool to open-source Higgins   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• OT: SSL certificate chain problems   Travis H.
• OT: SSL certificate chain problems   Massimiliano Pala
• OT: SSL certificate chain problems   Victor Duchovni
• OT: SSL certificate chain problems   Erik Tews
• OT: SSL certificate chain problems   Stefan Kelm
• OT: SSL certificate chain problems   Peter Gutmann
• OT: SSL certificate chain problems   Victor Duchovni
• OT: SSL certificate chain problems   Peter Gutmann
• OT: SSL certificate chain problems   Victor Duchovni
• OT: SSL certificate chain problems   Thor Lancelot Simon
• OT: SSL certificate chain problems   Victor Duchovni
• OT: SSL certificate chain problems   Peter Gutmann
• OT: SSL certificate chain problems   Victor Duchovni
• OT: SSL certificate chain problems   Geoffrey Hird
• Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases   Matthias Bruestle
• Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases   James A. Donald
• Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases   Joseph Ashwood
• Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases   Matthias Bruestle
• Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases   mheyman at gmail.com
• Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases   Allen
• Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases   Joseph Ashwood
• Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases   John Denker
• Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases   David Wagner
• Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases   John Denker
• Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases   Perry E. Metzger
• Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases   Bill Stewart
• Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases   Travis H.
• Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases   Steven M. Bellovin
• Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases   Travis H.
• Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases   Leichter, Jerry
• Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases   Abe Singer
• Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases   Matthias Bruestle
• Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases   Bill Stewart
• Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases   Allen
• Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases   Steven M. Bellovin
• Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases   Abe Singer
• Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases   Alexander Klimov
• Private Key Generation from Passwords/phrases   Anton Stiglic
• Real-world password guessing   Steve Schear
• SC-based link encryption   Steve Schear
• SC-based link encryption   Paul Hoffman
• SC-based link encryption   John Denker
• secure CRNGs and FIPS (Re: How important is FIPS 140-2 Level 1 cert?)   Matthias Bruestle
• SSL (https, really) accelerators for Linux/Apache?   John Ioannidis
• SSL (https, really) accelerators for Linux/Apache?   Victor Duchovni
• SSL (https, really) accelerators for Linux/Apache?   Scott Mustard
• SSL (https, really) accelerators for Linux/Apache?   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• SSL Server needs access to raw HTTP data (Request for adivce)   Richard Powell
• SSL Server needs access to raw HTTP data (Request for adivce)   Erik Tews
• SSL Server needs access to raw HTTP data (Request for adivce)   Richard Powell
• SSL Server needs access to raw HTTP data (Request for adivce)   Richard Powell
• SSL Server needs access to raw HTTP data (Request for adivce)   Richard Powell
• study shows "extended validation" TLS certs ineffective   Perry E. Metzger
• Tamperproof, yet playing Tetris.   Perry E. Metzger
• Tamperproof, yet playing Tetris.   Peter Gutmann
• Tamperproof, yet playing Tetris.   Richard Clayton
• Tamperproof, yet playing Tetris.   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• Tamperproof, yet playing Tetris.   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• Why AACS will fail   Frank A Stevenson

Last message date: Wed Jan 31 17:25:00 EST 2007
Archived on: Sun Aug 7 18:25:04 EDT 2011

• Messages sorted by: [ thread ] [ author ] [ date ]
• More info on this list...