quantum hype

[Arnold G. Reinhold]

At 6:38 PM -0400 9/18/03, John S. Denker wrote:
>
>Yes, Mallory can DoS the setup by reading (and thereby
>trashing) every bit.  But Mallory can DoS the setup by
>chopping out a piece of the cable.  The two are equally
>effective and equally detectable.  Chopping is cheaper and
>easier.
>
>Other key-exchange methods such as DH are comparably
>incapable of solving the DoS problem.  So why bring up
>the issue?

It seems to me that because key-exchange methods such as DH only 
depend on exchanging bits (as opposed to specifying a physical 
layer), they can rely on a wide variety of techniques to combat DoS. 
If Bob and Alice can safeguard their local connections to the 
Internet, its multi-routing properties provide significant DoS 
protection. Other options available to them include the switched 
telephone network, wireless, LEO satellites, cybercafes, 
steganography,  HF radio, and even postal mail. In addition, DH users 
have no need to call attention to themselves by leasing a fiber-optic 
line.

Arnold Reinhold

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