blackmail / real world stego use

[James A. Donald]

    --
"bear"
> > That would imply packet recording and correlation on a
> > level greater than we've ever considered to be in the
> > arsenal of cryptographic threats, implying the emergence of
> > forces (and inevitably of forces other than governments)
> > that have eavesdropping capabilities that cannot be
> > defeated except with time-delayed packet relay through many
> > hosts and re-encryption/ redecryption at each step of the
> > way.
> >
> > That is a model that does not permit realtime
> > communication, meaning that monitoring may be impossible to
> > escape for realtime activities such as web browsing.

Enzo Michelangeli
> That appears to be the conclusion reached by the developers
> of GNUnet:

Freenet's almost realtime nature probably means the authorities
can figure out what you are browsing if they have universal
monitoring  However the potentially long delay between
publication and appearance means that freenet could, if
implemented correctly, prevent the authorities from knowing who
published what, even with universal monitoring, and even if
they did know who read what. 

    --digsig
         James A. Donald
     6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
     HIFlk2xg8PcuQkPVphQIwlHu7paDKTZ7LIeE6d6f
     42WEQReKUM4YG5+yuVLp3ddu8GwoARZ/Yb9coUEfi


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