Cryptogram: Palladium Only for DRM

[Perry E. Metzger]

It takes a lot for me to get cranky around here, but I'm afraid Aarg!
has done it.

AARG!Anonymous <remailer at aarg.net> writes:
> Perry Metzger writes:
> > Why not simply design the OS so it is not a likely victim for viruses?
> > This is a general security problem, not one special to banking
> > operations.
> 
> That's a great idea.  I don't know why nobody thought of that before.

You conveniently cut what I said selectively, sarcastically replying
to only pieces of it. You completely ignored much of the substance,
such as the fact that in a correctly operating OS, MMUs+file
permissions do more or less stop processes from seeing each others
data if the OS functions correctly.

So, to summarize, you ignored most of what I said, but managed to be
incredibly rude. I've noticed you doing the same to lots of others.

Here's a strong suggestion for the future, Anonymous. Never anger the
moderator of a moderated mailing list. You can be the agent
provocateur all day long, but you can't be snide and unresponsive.

I'm going to ask that you go back and respond to my message without
being insulting and without being selective about what sections you
quote. If you want another copy, well, I don't know how to send it to
you -- I can only hope you saved it. Until then, I'm not forwarding
your mail.

If you want to play your game here, you're going to have to do it
politely and reasonably. Sorry for doing this in public but I have no
other way of communicating with you.


Perry

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