MS white paper says Palladium open, clean, not DRM

Hal Abelson hal at mit.edu
Thu Jul 18 16:43:41 EDT 2002


Hmm, let me see if I understand:

"Trusted computing" means trusting Microsoft not to exploit a major
new control point.





--------------------------------------------------
In reply to the message:

    Date: Thu, 18 Jul 2002 00:08:10 -0400
    From: "R. A. Hettinga" <rah at shipwright.com>

    http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/4/26231.html

    MS white paper says Palladium open, clean, not DRM
    By John Lettice
    Posted: 17/07/2002 at 09:25 GMT

    A final draft of Microsoft's Palladium consultation white paper appears to
    have escaped, and is currently being hosted by Neowin.net. Microsoft
    intends to open Palladium up for discussion, but it's not as yet clear to
    us whether this means it will be distributing the white paper to all and
    sundry, or whether it envisages a more restricted distribution list. In any
    event we haven't been able to nail down anywhere on the Microsoft site you
    can get it,* or any mention of the Microsoft Content Security Business
    Unit, which authored it.

    There's much in the paper that's interesting, and it's even interesting
    that it's in PDF format, rather than Word - the authors are clearly having
    a bash at being ecumenical. Palladium, it stresses, is not an operating
    system, but a collection of trusted subsystems and components that are
    opt-in. You will not get the advantages of Palladium if you don't opt in,
    of course, but you don't have to. It's als some years off, but one of the
    objectives is to make "a Windows-based device a trustworthy environment for
    any data." Which is a tall order.

    Software will have to be rewritten or specially developed to take advantage
    of Palladium, and software of this class is referred to as a Trusted Agent.
    Users will be able to separate their data into "realms," which are
    analogous to vaults and can have varying access and security criteria. The
    system does not need to know who you are, indeed doesn't really want to
    know who you are, because it's about verifying the identity of machines. So
    a company could identify an employee's home machine for secure operation
    remotely on the corporate network.

    Then it gets really interesting. "Palladium will not require Digital Rights
    Management (DRM) technology, and DRM will not require Palladium... They are
    separate technologies." Now, we know they don't need to be separate
    technologies, we know that Palladium could enhance DRM considerably, and we
    suspect that at least some people at Microsoft would take this route if
    they thought they could get away with it. But the authors here seem to have
    concluded that Palladium will not fly if it has a whiff of DRM about it,
    and are determined to distance themselves. This is good, people, if we all
    keep shouting 'DRM bad!' they stand a chance of not having their minds
    changed for them.

    Deeper into the Department of Bizarre Revolutions we have: "A Palladium
    system will be open at all levels." The hardware will "run any TOR"
    (Trusted Operating Root), the TOR will run "trusted agents from any
    publisher," will "work with any trusted service provider," (the authors
    envisage this as a new service category) and it'll all be independently
    verified.

    TOR source code will be published, Palladium will be regularly examined "by
    a credible security auditor" and anyone "can certify Palladium hardware or
    software, and we expect that many companies and organizations will offer
    this service."

    Of course, right now these are only words, the terms and conditions for
    publication, verification and auditing haven't been revealed, and Microsoft
    has a long and inglorious record in Untrustworthy Industry Leadership to
    overcome before we entirely buy the Trustworthy Computing pitch. However,
    as far as it goes, this little lot sounds plausible. If it were any other
    company, you might even be inclined to take it at face value. Keep talking,
    people, and prove you mean it. ®
    -- 
    -----------------
    R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah at ibuc.com>
    The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/>
    44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
    "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
    [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
    experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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