Linux-style kernel PRNGs and the FIPS140-2 test

Jim Gillogly jim at acm.org
Tue Jan 15 20:08:34 EST 2002


Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:
> 
> Many operating systems use "Linux-style" (environmental noise
> stirred with a hash function) generators to provide "random"
> and pseudorandom data on /dev/random and /dev/urandom
> respectively.
...
> The usual failure mode is "too many runs of 1 1s".  Using MD5
> instead of SHA1 as the mixing function, the Linux generator
> also displays "too many runs of 1 0s".  I have not yet seen
> other failure modes from these generators.
> 
> To reproduce my results, just compile the enclosed and do
> "a.out < /dev/urandom" on your platform of choice.

Last October in sci.crypt Greg Rose of Qualcomm reported:
- Furthermore, on October 10, a change notice was
- appended to the FIPS, to correct the false-alarm
- rate of the the Runs Test.

He went on to say:
- I believe that the reason the tests were updated
- was because the 1% error bound was too "loose".
- Basically, with about 10 independent tests being
- run, you could expect perfectly functional
- hardware to fail the power-on checks about one
- time in 20, for no good reason. The new bounds are
- still pretty good at detecting true
- non-randomness, particularly the kind that comes
- from typical hardware problems, but with a much
- smaller false-alarm rate. ...

- BTW, I've updated my fips140.c program to the new,
- correct, Runs Test values, and will send it to
- people if they want it. Hopefully we will soon

The internal date on the copy of Greg's fips140.c program
that you included with this message is 2000, so I imagine
you're using the old version.  Have you tried his newer
version, i.e. the one he believes reflects the current state
of FIPS140?
-- 
	Jim Gillogly
	Hevensday, 25 Afteryule S.R. 2002, 01:03
	12.19.8.16.5, 13 Chicchan 3 Muan, First Lord of Night



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